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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

FRANK FUOCO and ANN A
FUOCO,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS and
VERNA V. WILLIAMS,
Defendants.

No.
9860

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court of Salt Lake County entered on a special verdict
of a jury in a boundary line case.
The plaintiffs brought this suit against the defendants to quiet title to a tract of land located in Salt Lake
County, specifically described in the complaint, to enjoin the defendants from trespassing and for damages.
The defendants answered and counterclaimed alleging
ownership and right of possession of a specifically
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described tractof land and praying for injunctive relief
and damages. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a summary judgment based on a affidavit and map which
indicated that an overlap of approximately 20 feet was
created by a tie to a "county monument in the intersection of two county roads" which first appears in the
defendants' chain of title in a deed to the defendants
dated October 31, 1950. (R. 7-9).
After hearing, the trial court grant the motion for
summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had
record title to the 20 feet. However, the court permitted
the filing of an amended answer and counterclaim
to plead title by adverse possession and acquiescence.
(R. 10). Such amended pleading was filed. (R. 14-17).
At the pre-trial conference the court ruled that before
the defendants could present evidence upon the issue
of adverse possession "they must supply the plaintiffs
with a copy of the tax description showing description
of the property under which they claim to have paid
taxes ... at least ten days prior to trial." (R. 19-21).
This was not done. The only remaining issue was title
by acquiescence.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The twenty-foot strip of land in dispute is shown
on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "'ABCD", "AB" being
the boundary line claimed by the defendants and "CD"
being the line claimed by the plaintiffs. (R. 56). The
property in question is located near the intersection of
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Highland Drive and 3900 South. There was no fence
along either the line AB or CD until a few weeks prior
to the filing of the suit when the plaintiffs put fence
posts along CD. These were removed by the defendants, who constructed a fence along AB. (R. 64, 65,
86, 87). This precipitated the suit.
The testimony of the defendant B. H. Williams
is set out rather fully because the appellants' claim that
no title by acquiescence was proved, and that if there
is proof anywhere in the record, it is by this testimony.
(R. 57).
Q. Mr. Williams, I ask you if for at least the
last twenty-five years you are acquainted
with every use that has been made of this
property, including this twenty-foot strip, on
which you live.

A. I have used it and cultivated it, plowed it
and harrowed it or had it plowed and harrowed and pulled the weeds out, hoed it, cultivated it, treated it up to the present time.
Q. For how many years have you done this yourself?

A. Since 1934.
Q. And has any other person to your knowledge
made any use of that IandA. No, sir.
Q. -lying east of the fence?

A. No, sir.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Williams, if during all of
this twenty-five year period, if you know,
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whether a ditch has been in existence just
immediately west of your fence line.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And I ask you, sir, if that ditch had any relationship to the boundary line you old timers
recognized.

MR. SKEEN: If the Court please, I object
on the ground that it is leading and calling
for a conclusion of the witness.
THE COURT: Well, he may answer if it
had any relationship. Of course, he may
state without direction what the relationship
was.
Q. Did this old ditch I asked you, Mr. Williams,
if you know, have any relationship to a boundary line between the old timers' properties
and that you and your father claimed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I ask you, Mr. Williams-

THE COURT: Now, before we leave that,
in view of his objection, let's pursue that
and ask him what that relationship is.
Q. How was this ditch used, if at all?

A. For an irrigation ditch.
Q. Yes. How was it used, if at all, as a boundary
marker?

A. WellMR. SKEEN: I object on the ground that
it's obviously a leading question, Your
Honor.
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THE COURT: Well, you may answer what
use you made of theMR. SKEEN: Calls for conclusion.
THE COURT: -ditch. Did you use any
water out of the ditch 1
A. Yes.
THE COURT: Did you cultivate up to the
ditch?
A. Yes, sir. I didn't use the water out of that
ditch on the east side. ( R. 59) .
Mr. Williams testified that the ditch had been
located "along the west side of the property" for about
twenty-five years. (R. 63). Mr. Fuoco first claimed to
own land east of the ditch in 1960. That was the first
year he can1e into the neighborhood. (R. 63). On crossexamination Mr. Williams testified that the location
of the ditch had been changed several times. ( R. 7172). An effort was made to relate the location of the
small lateral which Mr. Williams claimed ran along
the line AB to an old fence which ran north and south
of the road or lane now known as 3970 South. Mr.
Williams testified as follows:
Q. Do you know where that fence was located
with respect to the flume under-the ditch
passed through and going under the lane 1
A. Right at the corner.
Q. Right at the corner?
A. Northeast corner of that or south-yes-be
southeast corner of that section over there.
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Q. In other words, the flume-

A. Northwest corner of the otherQ. -the flume was at the southeast corner-

A. Of the oldQ. -of the old fence, right on the south end of
the old fence?

A. Yes, sir. (R. 74).
On redirect Mr. Williams testified the ditch was
on the west side of the fence (constructed in 1962) for
twenty-five years.
The plaintiffs' witnesses Young and Sanders testified that the old ditch crossed the lane near a fence
which is marked by three crosses in red pencil on Exhibit P-1 (opposite the line CD) and that it then proceeded directly south. (R. 91, 113, 115). The ditch
was "done away with" in 1954 when a neighbor to the
south (Hanson) constructed a fence across it. (R. 92,
118).

The land now owned by plaintiffs was leased by the
defendant Williams for a number of years. He cultivated it, put it in potatoes, tomatoes and corn, and
irrigated it from the ditch in question (R. 114, 115).
Most of the time the Fuoco property was just up in
weeds .. ( R. 134) . The testimony regarding common
operation of the two properties by Williams, and the
fact that most of the time it was "just in weeds" is not
contradicted in the record.
Mr. Young testified also that until 1941 or 1942
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there was a barn east of the common boundary line and
that the land was used only for deposit of refuse. (R.
137). This was not denied.
The trial court ruled as a rna tter of law that the
defendants had proved title by acquiescence, and submitted to the jury one question, and that was regarding
the location of the ditch which was claimed as the visible
monument which established the boundary line. This
appeal is taken from the judgment on the special
verdict signed by the Clerk of the District Court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The defendant did not establish a boundary by

acquiescence.
2. The court erred in refusing to submit to the

jury the issue of title by acquiescence.
3. The special verdict was erroneous, self contra-

dictory and confusing, and the judgment based thereon
is not supported by the verdict or by the evidence.

ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANTS DID NOT ESTABLISH A BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE.
As indicated above, the trial court granted a summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that the record
title to the disputed twenty-foot strip was in the plain9
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tiffs. The defendants amended alleging title by adverse
possession and title by acquiescence. The adverse possession theory was ruled out by failure to show payment of taxes. ( R. 20) . The only issue left in the case
was title to the disputed area by acquiescence.
This Court has held that in order to make a case
under the acquiescence doctrine, it must be shown:
( 1) There was uncertainty as to the location of
the true boundary.
( 2) The parties have occupied their respective
parcels up to an open boundary line, visibly marked
by monuments, fences or buildings.
(3) The monument, fence or building must have
existed for a long period of time.
( 4) The monument, fence or building must have
been mutually recognized as the dividing line.
King v. Fronk, 378 P. 2d 893; Brown v. Milliner,
232 P 2d 202, 120 Utah 16; Glenn v. Whitney, 209 P
2d 257, 116 Utah 267; Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P
2d 1053, 2 Utah 2d 119; Hummel v. Young, 265 P 2d
410, 1 Utah 2d 237.
In the case of King v. Fronk, supra, the court
referred to the boundary marked on the ground as
"monuments visibly placed", "monumented line", and
an "existing line marked by monuments". There never
having been a fence on the disputed boundary until
a few \Veeks before the trial, the only basis for acqui-
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escence in this case was considering the irrigation ditch
to be a "monument" within the meaning of the rule .
. A. monument is defined by the dictionary as "permanent landmarks established for the purpose of indicating boundaries." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third
Edition.

Obviously an irrigation ditch is not ordinarily constructed for the purpose of marking a boundary. It
is used for carrying· water to the place of use and must
be constructed to conform to the· slope and contour
of the land and to connect with other ditches and laterals. An irrigation ditch would not give notice to one
who views it that it would establish a boundary line as
in the case of a fence or building. If we assume for the
sake of argument that the land in each tract was occupied up to a small ditch, such as the one involved here,
this fact alone would not put the·parties upon notice of
intent to claim ownership to the ditch. A landowner
"could not irrigate up hill from a ·ditch" and the fact
that his neighbor used the land to the ditch could easily
be explained as a neighborly act or a grant of license.
There is no evidence in the record that either the
defendants or the plaintiffs or their predecessors treated
the ditch as a boundary. The only testimony which by
any stretch of the imagination bears on the subject
is Mr. Williams' statement that he used and cultivated
the land on which he lives, including the twenty-foot
strip since 1934. The court directed leading questions
to the witness as to whether the ditch had any relation11
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ship to the boundary line, and the witness only testified
that the ditch was used as an irrigation ditch. See p.
6 of this brief.
Much of the testimony at the trial relates to the
location of the ditch. Mr. Williams testified that it
was located on the west side of "my fence line." (R. 63).
On cross examination Mr. Williams was reminded that
the fence had been built just before suit was commenced
and he was asked to tie the location of the ditch to an
old fence line which has persisted many years on the
north side of the lane. The fence is marked on Exhibit
PI by three red cross marks and is directly opposite
the boundary line CD claimed by plaintiffs. Mr. Williams testified that the ditch in question crosses under
the lane "right on the south end of the old fence". (R.
74) . This is exactly where plaintiffs' witnesses said it
was located. (R. 92, II3, II5, I26, I27, I29, I30). It
is significant that all located the ditch on the line CD
on Exhibit PI when describing the ditch location with
reference to the old fence north of the lane (3970
South) which has existed in the same location as far
back as I924. (R. I26). Mr. Williams testified at one
point in the trial: "The ditch has been changed quite
a few times in there. I don't know just exactly where
it comes." (R. 7I). Mr. Young testified that the ditch,
which the defendants attempt to use as a monument,
was "done away with" in I954. (R. 92). This is not
contradicted.
The ditch involved was small. The flume under
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the lane has a two-by-twelve top on it. (R. 93). This
means the flume was 12 inches wide.
It is highly significant with regard to defendants'
claim that the ditch was the dividing line to refer briefly
to the testimony of Owen C. Sanders, who moved next
door to the Fuoco property in 1935. He testified that
for "probably ten years" the Fuoco property was leased.
Mr. 'Villiams leased the property, now owned by Fuoco,
for a number of years and used the ditch in question
to irrigate the Fuoco property. (R. 114-115). Most
of the time the Fuoco property was "just up in weeds".
(R. 134). Also witness Frank Young testified that
the irrigation ditch crossed the road about ten or fifteen
feet west of an old barn and while the barn was there
they threw out refuse, manure and apples between the
barn and the ditch. There was no garden in the vicinity
of the ditch. (R. 137). The barn was torn down in
1941 or 1942. (R. 138).
This testimony regarding the use of the land west
of the barn is not disputed, and such use continued to
1941 or 1942. There obviously was no cultivation up
to the ditch during this period. After the barn was torn
down, there was only a period of 12 to 13 years when
it would have been possible for either party to claim
the ditch was the dividing line. This is not long enough.
King v. Fronk, supra. Also the ditch falls short of the
requirement of a "visible boundary of ancient vintage
and persistency of placement." King v. Fronk, supra.
In view of the failure of the defendants to prove
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the continued existence of a monument definitely establishing a boundary line, and mutually recognized as
such by the parties, it is submitted that the trial court
erred in holding as a matter of law that there was a
boundary by acquiescence. The Court erred in denying
the plaintiffs' timely motion for a directed verdict for
the plaintiffs upon the ground that there was no evidence showing acquiescence in a common boundary line.
(R. 144).
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
SUBMIT TO THE JURY THE ISSUE OF
TITLE BY ACQUIESCENCE.
If we assume for the sake of argument only that
there was some evidence of acquiescence, we contend
that the factual issues of elements of title by acquiescence should have been submitted to the jury. Appropriate requests for instructions were made by plaintiffs, and were refused. ( R. 23, 24) . Exceptions were
taken. (R. 147, 148).
Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that when a jury has been demanded, the trial of all
issues so demanded shall be by the jury. Rule 52 provides that in all actions tried upon the facts without a
jury the Court shall find the facts specially and state
separately its conclusions of law. In this case the court
refused to submit all issues to the jury, and did not
make separate findings, conclusions and judgment as
required by the rule. The court obviously should have

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

done one thing or the other. This was error which requires reversal.

THE SPECIAL VERDICT WAS ERRONEOUS, SELF CONTRADICTORY AND CONFUSING AND THE JUDGMENT BASED
THEREON IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
VERDICT OR BY THE EVIDENCE.
The trial court ignored the obvious issues of fact
involved in proving a title by acquiescence including
such issues as mutual recognition of a common boundary line marked by a monument, and the issues as to
the number of years, if any, when such a marked and
visible boundary line was so recognized, and instructed
the jury that ''Mr. Williams is entitled to the land
up to the east side of that ditch." This was error. It is
stated in the form of verdict, "there is only one question
and that is the location on the ground of the east bank
of the original ditch through which the Fuoco property
was irrigated." The court did not define in the verdict
what he meant by the "original ditch". The word
"original" was not used by the witnesses, and the question is so vague it is meaningless. There is testimony
of the course of the ditch from above Highland Drive
to a point near the south end of the Fuoco property.
The ditch runs east and west and north and south. In
the second and third paragraphs of the special verdict
the court points out that the jury cannot find the east
bank of the ditch to be west of the line AB. The answer
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of the jury is, "The ditch runs North and South, just
west of A and B line on exh. No. 1."
The verdict ignores the instruction of the court
that the line cannot be west of AB. It is indefinite.
What do the words "just west" mean? How far? A
foot or two feet? No one knows.
The judgment on the special verdict signed by
the clerk spells out that "the northwest corner of which
division line is 295.02 feet west of the center of Highland Drive, and extends thence south 165 feet between
the property of plaintiffs, and the property of defendants, which are involved herein which said point is likewise about two feet west of an existing fence ... "The
judgment then goes on to specifically describe the
property involved. The first part of the description,
it will be noted, is the same as that in the amended
answer and counterclaim which has two starting points
and describes two different areas. The latter part of
the description ties to the "east bank of the irrigation
ditch existing between the properties of the plaintiffs
lying west of said point and those of the defendants
lying east of said point ... " (Emphasis added).
The uncontradicted evidence is that the ditch relied
upon as the boundary was destroyed in 1954. It is not
"existing". There is no evidence of a tie of 295.02 feet
from the center of a county road. Exhibit PI shows by
the irregularly shaped areas in red pencil and plain
pencil, the confusion caused in the description of defendants' land by the two starting points in the de-
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scription, one being "at a point North 1010.60 feet and
East 1134.15 feet from the Southwest corner of the
Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 33", and the other being "at a point South 14
24' 30" East 717.26 feet from a county monument in
the intersection of two county roads." There is absolutely no evidence in the record to support the description contained in the judgment. Also, the judgment is
void because it goes beyond the special verdict, purports
to interpret the meaning of the words "just west" and
purports to make findings, conclusions and a decree,
all of which are judicial functions. It is signed by the
clerk.
o

It is respectfully submitted that the judgment
must be reversed. The District Court should be directed
to enter a judgment for the appellants.

E. J. SKEEN
Attorney for Appellants
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